

Ergative constellations in the structure of speech acts

Martina Wiltschko

UBC

X.1 Introduction

Ergativity is a heterogeneous phenomenon (Bittner & Hale 1994). The surface constellations associated with it indicate that we need to distinguish two structural layers: a layer where arguments are introduced (henceforth *argument-structure*) and a layer where grammatical relations (case) are introduced (henceforth *case-structure*) (cf. Williams 2003).

The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that we find similar structural constellations in the layer of structure where speech act relations are introduced (Speas & Tenny 2003, Haegeman 2013). In particular, I argue that speech act structure (henceforth SA-structure) consists of a grounding layer, where the speaker's or the addressee's commitment towards the proposition are encoded. The second layer of SA-structure is dedicated to the response system of language: e.g., what the speaker (henceforth S) wants the addressee (henceforth A) to do with the utterance. Each of these layers can come in different guises, in much the same way as argument-structure can be transitive, ergative, or unergative.

This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 I introduce ergative constellations in the domain of argument-structure. In section 3, I introduce background

assumptions regarding the syntax of speech acts. And in sections 4 and 5 I show that the logic of ergativity can be equally applied to SA-structure. In section 6, I conclude.

X.2 The heterogeneity of ergativity and the logic behind it

An ergative/absolutive system is typically described as follows: intransitive subjects are marked like transitive objects but differently from transitive subjects. In particular, transitive subjects are marked as ergative while intransitive subjects and objects are marked as absolutive. This contrasts with nominative/accusative systems in which transitive and intransitive subjects are identically marked as nominative while objects are marked differently, namely as accusative (Dixon 1979).

While all ergative systems have in common that transitive subjects differ from intransitive subjects in some ways, there are also many ways in which such systems differ from each other. Hence, it has become clear that ergativity is a surface phenomenon that can come about in different ways and it does not come as a surprise that many different analyses have been proposed (see Coon & Preminger 2013, Deal to appear for an overview).

From a generative perspective it is not surprising that surface ergativity comes about in different ways: the key notions that identify ergative constellations are not primitives. That is, *transitive subjects*, *transitive objects*, and *intransitive subjects* are all derived concepts. To understand ergativity from a generative point of view, we need to understand these notions.

Within the generative tradition, subjects are not a unified concept. Rather, they are defined across various levels of structure. That is, one of the key insights within the

Principles and Parameters framework (Chomsky 1981 a.o.) is the distinction between thematic roles and grammatical (case) roles. Thematic roles are assigned to arguments by the verbs that introduce them, while grammatical roles are assigned by functional categories (such as INFL). This assumption accounts for the fact that arguments that are realized as grammatical subjects can bear different thematic relations to their verbs. For example, in the active voice, the agent is realized as the grammatical subject (1)a, while in the passive voice it is the theme or patient which is realized as the grammatical subject (1)b.


- (1) a. The dog was catching the ball.
- b. The ball was caught by the dog.

This type of mismatch between thematic and grammatical roles is precisely the motivator for separating the thematic domain from the domain of grammatical relations and structural case-assignment.

The separation between thematic and grammatical roles was not always complete. Rather, initially, it was assumed that in passive sentences the thematic object role and the grammatical object role were both assigned in the complement of V, while the thematic subject role and the grammatical subject role were both assigned in SpecIP. The mismatch between these roles observed in passives was analyzed as involving the absorption of accusative case via passive morphology (Baker et al. 1989), which in turn results in the unavailability of the agent role (Burzio 1986). Given the assumption that all sentences must have subjects and that all arguments must receive case, the object

argument was assumed to move to SpecIP where it receives nominative case. Hence, this is a situation where the thematic role is assigned in a different position than the grammatical role.

(2) The GB-style analysis of passive




Since this first deconstruction of thematic and grammatical roles however, there have been two seminal assumptions, which resulted in a complete structural distinction between thematic and grammatical roles. These two assumptions are the VP-internal subject hypothesis (Koopman and Sportiche 1991) and the assumption that accusative case, like nominative case, is assigned by a functional category above the VP (Borer 1994, 2005, Megerdumian 2000).¹

¹ Not everyone subscribes to this conceptualization of the case domain. In particular, it is often assumed that accusative is assigned by v – the same (semi-) functional head which introduces the external argument (Chomsky 1995, a.o.). However, evidence from systems where accusative case-assignment is sensitive to aspectual properties suggests otherwise (Kiparsky 1998). Even if accusative case is assigned by v , the points about ergativity to

As for the VP-internal subject hypothesis, in its current incarnation it is usually assumed that agents are introduced by a semi-functional head v (Kratzer 1996, Chomsky 1992). Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between heads and their arguments. This yields a complete separation of argument-structure from case-structure as illustrated in (3) (Williams 2003; Wiltschko 2014).

(3) A two-layered system



Thus, we can identify two notions of subjects: thematic subjects realized in Spec v P and grammatical subjects realized in SpecIP. And similarly, we can identify two notions of objects: thematic objects, realized within VP and grammatical objects realized in SpecAsp.

The assumption that both subjects and objects come in (at least) two different types (thematic and grammatical) has important implications for our understanding of ergativity. Note that the classic description of ergativity makes no distinction between thematic and grammatical roles. Once this division is in place however, we can


follow still hold. What is important is that thematic roles are structurally separate from grammatical roles.

distinguish between two notions of ergativity. On the one hand we can define ergativity in terms of thematic relations only. And on the other hand we can define ergativity in terms of grammatical relations.

In his seminal paper, Perlmutter 1978 identifies two types of intransitive verbs. Those whose sole argument starts out like the thematic object of a transitive verb. These are known as *unaccusative* verbs. In a nominative/accusative system, such arguments still behave like transitive subjects, at least on the surface. This is because verbs that lack an external argument fail to assign accusative case (hence the label *unaccusative*). Consequently, the underlying object moves to the position of grammatical subjects, just like the object of a passive verb as in (4)b.


In contrast, there is also a class of verbs whose sole argument starts out like the subject of a transitive verb and hence this argument shares some properties with transitive subjects (4)a. These are known as *unergative* verbs, a label which reflects the fact that the behavior of the contrasting class of verbs (unaccusative verbs) is akin to ergativity. And indeed some scholars refer to unaccusative verbs as *ergative verbs* (e.g., Burzio 1981, den Besten 1981), a convention I will follow.

- (4) a. unergative verbs b. unaccusative (=ergative) verbs



Within the minimalist program, theory-internal considerations lead Chomsky 1992 to adopt an alternative conceptualization of unergatives, namely that of Hale & Keyser 1993 (henceforth H&K). According to H&K, unergative verbs are best analyzed as concealed transitives: they come with an internal argument, which incorporates into the verb as in (5).

(5) Unergatives as concealed transitives



Thus, even languages that are otherwise nominative/accusative system show effects of ergativity: in terms of argument-structure properties, intransitive subjects may behave either like transitive subjects or like transitive objects. Since this type of ergativity is exclusively a matter of argument structure, I refer to it as *argument-structure ergativity*. It contrasts with *case-structure ergativity* which arises as a matter of grammatical marking. That is, case-structure ergativity is not a matter of how many arguments are introduced at the argument-structure layer, but instead it concerns the marking of those arguments in terms of their grammatical relations (often in the form of case or agreement).

In a nominative/accusative system the subject of an intransitive is marked in the same way as the subject of a transitive (i.e., nominative) and the transitive object receives special case (i.e., accusative). In contrast, in an ergative/absolutive system the subject of an intransitive is marked in the same way as the object of a transitive (i.e., ergative) and the transitive subject receives special case (i.e., ergative). Thus, case-structure ergativity has in common with argument-structure ergativity the fact that transitive subjects are special. As discussed at length in this volume, there are three core analyses to account for the difference between ergative and accusative case systems. According to early approaches (Murasugi 1992, Campana 1992, and Bobaljik 1993) case-assignment is correlated with agreement triggered by functional heads. In a nominative system, the higher functional head is always active whereas the lower functional head is only active if there is an argument associated with the higher head. Hence transitive objects receive a different case (ACC) than transitive and intransitive subjects, as in (6). In an ergative system, the lower functional head is always active whereas the higher head is only active if there is an argument associated with the lower head. Hence transitive subjects will receive a different case than intransitive subjects (which remain associated with the lower position), as in (7).

(6) nominative system

- a. $[_{F2} \text{arg}_{\text{nom}} [_{F1} \quad [\text{arg } \nu [_{VP} \text{V} \quad]]]] \rightarrow \text{intransitive}$
- b. $[_{F2} \text{arg}_{\text{nom}} [_{F1} \text{arg}_{\text{acc}} [\text{arg } \nu [_{VP} \text{V} \text{arg}]]]] \rightarrow \text{transitive}$

(7) ergative system

a. [F2 [F1 arg_{abs} [arg v [VP V]]]] → intransitive

b. [F2 arg_{erg} [F1 arg_{abs} [arg v [VP V arg]]]] → transitive

Several problems have been identified with this line of approach, including the fact that case doesn't always correlate with agreement (see for example Baker, in press) and some of the movements necessary for the analysis are not motivated under minimalist assumptions.

The two prevalent approaches in current minimalist theorizing are the *dependent case approach* and the *inherent case approach*. According to the former (which has its roots in Marantz 1991) the ergative/accusative contrast follows from a parameter akin to (8). There is a structural case which can only be assigned if another argument appears in the same domain (see Baker & Vinokurova 2010, Baker, in press, Bobaljik (2008), Coon & Preminger, this volume a.o.))

(8) The dependent case analysis

If there are two distinct NPs in the same clause (“governed by V+I”) then:

- i) Mark the lower one with dependent case (accusative) and/or
- ii) Mark the higher one with dependent case (ergative).
- iii) Otherwise, mark NPs with unmarked/default case (called nominative or absolutive).

Adapted from Baker, in press (3)

According to the inherent case approach, ergative case is treated as an inherent case rather than a structural case and thus correlates with thematic role assignment (see Woolford 1997, 2006; Aldridge 2004, 2008, 2012; Legate 2006, 2008, 2012; Nash 1996; Anand and Nevins 2006; Massam 2006; Laka 2006; and Mahajan 2012). Hence on this view, ergative case is assumed to be assigned in the domain of argument-structure, much lower than any of the structural cases.

In the remainder of this paper I explore the question as to whether ergative properties are found in SA-structure as well.

X.3. Introducing speech act structure

Speech acts are often considered a purely pragmatic phenomenon. That is, traditionally syntax is taken to be the module that regulates the composition of meaningful units of language into larger constituents and phrases. The unit of investigation for many syntacticians is typically a sentence expressing a proposition, which is in turn the maximal unit of analysis of many semanticists. There is however a body of research that seeks to incorporate elements of speech acts into the domain of syntax. The purpose of this section is to review this literature. It will serve as the backdrop against which we explore ergative constellations in SA-structure.

X.3.1 Ross' 1970 performative hypothesis

Within the generative literature, the primacy of the sentence for syntactic investigations has first been called into question by Ross 1970. He proposes a layer of structure that

dominates the root clause and encodes the illocutionary force of a given utterance. Ross takes this layer to be another type of clause, consisting of a predicate (e.g., a verb of saying) a subject (the speaker) and an object (the addressee). This analysis is known as the *performative hypothesis* because its core insight is that even declarative clauses can be viewed as being *performative*, i.e., by uttering a declarative S does something, namely performing an act of speaking (see also Sadock 1969, 1974). Ross' analysis is schematized in Figure X1.




Figure X.1 Ross' 1970 performative hypothesis

The surface declarative clause is analyzed as being embedded in a superordinate structure, which can roughly be paraphrased as *I tell you that* . Since none of the postulated components of the superordinate structure are overtly marked, Ross 1970 assumes a rule of *performative deletion* according to which the superordinate structure is deleted deriving the surface form *I have a dog*.²

² This analysis is couched within a framework that took Deep structure (DS) to be the input for interpretation.

If there is no overt marking of the superordinate structure, how do we know that it is still part of syntax, rather than simply being a matter of pragmatic inferencing? Ross 1970 discusses a series of arguments having to do with i) the presence of a higher first person subject (the speaker); ii) the presence of a verb of saying above the matrix clause; iii) the presence of a higher 2nd person indirect object (the addressee); and iv) the possibility to modify the performative clause.

If there is indeed another layer above the root of the clause, and if this layer can be characterized in terms of another predicate-argument-structure, then we expect to find the hallmark of ergative constellations. However, before we can explore whether this is indeed the case, we need to be sure that we have an adequate framework within which to pursue this question. That is, it is well known that Ross' 1970 analysis faces serious problems, which were sufficient for the field to reject the performative hypothesis (Anderson 1971, Fraser 1974, Gazdar 1979, Grewendorf 1972, Mittwoch 1977, Newmeyer 1986).

However, the arguments Ross presented, as well as the general insight that speech acts ought to be syntactically represented didn't die out completely. Its revival is in part made possible by the discovery of functional categories. That is, much like the insights of generative semantics into the decomposition of events has been reanalyzed in terms of postulating a series of (semi-)functional categories within the VP-domain (see Ramchand 2010 a.o.) the decomposition of speech acts has been reanalysed in terms of postulating a series of functional categories above the CP domain . Among the categories postulated by different scholars we find PragP (Hill 2006), SpeechActP (SAP, Hill 2007a,b, Krifka 2013), AttitudeP (Paul, to appear), and PartP (Haegeman 2014, Zu (in press))

I turn to the most prominent incarnation of this type of analyses in the next subsection.

X.3.2 *Functional categories in the speech act domain*

The current revival of the performative hypothesis – let us call it the *neo-performative hypothesis* – presents some overt evidence for the existence of SA-structure. In particular, recent syntactic analyses focus on units of language that directly encode SA-structure. These include evidential markers (Speas & Tenny 2003), sentence-peripheral particles (Haegeman 2013), Vocatives (Hill 2013), and response particles (Krifka 2013), among others. These units of language are incorporated into syntactic structures in ways that indicate the workings of the syntactic component: they display linear ordering restrictions, pronominalization patterns, scope effects, and agreement patterns. For reasons of space, I limit the discussion to agreement effects. As mentioned in Ross 1970, some languages display S-agreement in gender. Thai is such a language as shown in (9). The sentence peripheral marker *khráp* is used with male speakers while *kâ* is used for female speakers.

- (9) a. Khaw maa khráp.
 he come spkr=male
 ‘He is coming.’
- b. Khaw maa kâ.
 he come spkr=female
 ‘He is coming.’

On the assumption that agreement is syntactic (Chomsky 1981, 1995, 2001) S must be represented in the clausal architecture (see Giorgi 2009 for explicit arguments that S coordinates are represented in the CP-layer). And similarly, there are languages that display A-agreement (i.e., allocutive agreement; Miyagawa 2014). For example, in the Basque examples in (10), the sentence final auxiliary differs in form depending on the gender and number of A as well as the nature of the relation between S and A such that formal status is explicitly encoded (10).

(10) Basque A-agreement


- | | | | | |
|----|-----------------|----------|-------------|----------------|
| a. | Pettek | lan | egin | dik |
| | Peter.erg | work.abs | DO.PRF AUX- | 2masc |
| | 'Peter worked.' | | | |
| b. | Pettek | lan | egin | din |
| | Peter.erg | work.abs | do.prf aux- | 2fem |
| | 'Peter worked.' | | | |
| c. | Pettek | lan | egin | dizü |
| | Peter.erg | work.abs | do.prf aux- | 2formal |
| | 'Peter worked.' | | | |
| d. | Pettek | lan | egin | du |
| | Peter.erg | work.abs | do.prf aux- | 2pl |
| | 'Peter worked.' | | | |

Miyagawa 2012: (8) cited from Oyharçabal 1993

Again, if agreement is syntactically conditioned, it must be the case that A is represented syntactically (see Zanuttini 2008).

In sum, evidence from agreement patterns lends support to the syntactic encoding of speech act participants. Thus, despite the problems that the performative hypothesis faces, there are still empirical generalizations that need to be accounted for. This is precisely what neo-performative hypotheses seek to achieve: they capture (among other things) the evident presence of speech-act participants in the syntactic structure but they are not vulnerable to the same criticism as Ross' original proposal (see Speas & Tenny 2003: 338 for explicit comparison). While Ross 1970 took the superordinate structure to be a run-of-the-mill matrix clause of the type $s[NP VP]$, neo-performative analyses take the superordinate structure to be an extension of the functional projection of the clause. For example, Speas & Tenny 2003 propose a complex speech act phrase (saP) consisting of two layers, as illustrated in (11). The higher head introduces S in its specifier position and takes a lower saP as its complement, which in turn hosts the utterance content in its specifier and A (labeled Hearer in Speas and Tenny 2003) in its complement.

(11) Speech act structure in the extended clausal projection



This model preserves the main insight of the performative hypothesis, in that it postulates a superordinate SA-structure. While this structure is part of the functional architecture, Speas & Tenny 2003 suggest that it still follows the same logic as argument-structure,

adopting the framework of Hale and Keyser 1993. According to this proposal, SA-structure is likened to the double object construction: S serves as the agent of the speech act; the utterance content serves as the theme and A as its goal. Thus, they maintain the assumption that – in the context of an assertion – SA-structure encodes something like ‘*I give the utterance to you*’. Speas & Tenny 2003 further argue that the restriction on the number of speech acts we observe across languages follows from the available structural configurations. In particular, *interrogatives* are derived by a passive-like movement such that the hearer moves above the speaker, and *imperatives* and *subjunctives* are defined by their non-finite utterance content. Note that *subjunctive* is not typically included in the list of speech acts. It appears that Speas & Tenny 2003 take clause-type or mood to be the defining property of speech acts. However, things are more complicated in that clause-type alone is not a reliable predictor of illocutionary force. For example, rising declaratives, extensively discussed in Gunlogson 2003, 2008, are formally declaratives but are associated with rising intonation which triggers a questioning interpretation. Thus, while Speas & Tenny’s analysis of SA-structure doesn’t face the problems of Ross’ 1970, it comes with its own problems (Gärtner & Steinbach 2006). Here I address one potential problem that arises in the context of the present hypothesis. Specifically, given the argument-structure approach towards SA-structure we would expect to find argument-structure ergativity in the domain of SA-structure (see Haegeman 2013). Speas and Tenny 2003 however do not discuss this possibility. And given their particular implementation of SA-structure this is not surprising. What we would expect based on their analysis is to find two types of intransitive speech acts: those that have an external (S) argument (S) only would parallel unergative predicates while those that have an

internal (A) argument only, would parallel ergative (aka unaccusative) predicates. Given that every utterance requires the presence of S, the latter option seems non-sensical. And this may be the reason Speas & Tenny 2003 didn't pursue this possibility.

Thus, either ergativity plays no role in SA-structure or else we have to rethink the composition of SA-structure. In what follows, I pursue the latter option showing that there are independent reasons to postulate a different model of SA-structure.

X.3.3 *The complexity of speech acts*

There are two problems with the neo-performative hypothesis as conceived of in Speas & Tenny 2003 and subsequent work. First, there is empirical evidence that A is structurally higher than S (Lam 2014, Heim et al. 2014). For example, Cantonese, has a series of sentence-peripheral discourse particles. Relevant for the present purpose are two such particles. *me1*³ combines with declaratives and derives a *request for confirmation* with a negative bias on behalf of S, as in (12)b. Hence, *me1* is classified as an *S-oriented* particle. The second particle, *ho2* also derives a request for confirmation, but it introduces an additional meaning component, namely that S assumes that A believes p, (12)c. Hence *ho2* is classified as an *A-oriented* particle (see Lam 2014 for detailed discussion).

- (12) a. zi3ming4 jau5 fu6ceot1 gwo3 si4gaan3
 Jimmy have devote Asp time
 ‘Jimmy has spent time (on the project).’

³ Numbers indicate tone.

- b. zi3ming4 jau5 fu6ceot1 gwo3 si4gaan3 me1?
 Jimmy have devote Asp time prt
 ‘Jimmy has spent time (on the project), has he?’
- c. zi3ming4 jau5 fu6ceot1 gwo3 si4gaan3 gaa3 ho2?
 Jimmy have devote Asp time prt prt
 ‘Jimmy has spent time (on the project), right?’

Crucially, the two particles can co-occur but their ordering is restricted such that A-oriented *ho2* has to follow S-oriented *me1*, as in (13).

- (13) Jimmy is the first of a long taxi queue. A taxi is coming, but someone not from the queue opens the door of the taxi saying loudly that he is in a hurry. Everyone in the queue is angry. Jimmy says this to the second person in the queue:

- a. daai6 seng1 zau6 dak1 gaa3 laa3 me1 ho2
 loud voice then okay prt prt prt prt
 ‘What can one get by just by being loud? I assume you’d agree it’s a valid question, right?’
- b. *daai6 seng1 zau6 dak1 gaa3 laa3 ho2 me1
 loud voice then okay prt prt prt prt

Lam 2014: 64 (6)

Assuming that the further to the right a particle appears the higher it must be in the hierarchical structure (Lam 2014), we have to conclude that the A-argument is structurally higher than the S-argument.⁴ This suggests that SA-structure is organized differently than assumed under current neo-performative analyses.⁵ This further implies that the common conceptualization of declarative clauses in terms of *I give p to you* cannot be on the right track. Interestingly, pragmatic analyses of speech acts have changed since Ross 1970. His view of declaratives reflects the assumption that declarative assertions have the following conditions of use:

- (14) Conditions of use for declarative assertions
- i) S believes the proposition (*p*) conveyed by her utterance.
 - ii) S wants A to adopt *p* into her set of beliefs

Bach and Harnish 1979

⁴ An anonymous reviewer points out that the linear order would also be compatible with an analysis whereby particles are head-initial and the utterance content moves above the particles. In this case S would have to be associated with the higher position, as in Speas & Tenny 2003. However, this analysis is inconsistent with the otherwise systematic head-finality of Cantonese. Moreover, the interpretation of the particles suggests that the A-oriented one scopes above the S-oriented one: A is asked to respond to S's belief.

⁵ See Thoma, in preparation for additional arguments based on discourse particles in Bavarian German.

This view doesn't capture all declaratives, however. In particular, there are (at least) two ways in which a declarative can be modified. First, S may modify the commitment towards p thereby changing what is being said. Much of Speas' 2003 work explores this type of speech-act modification. For example, S can indicate, by means of an evidential marker, that they don't have direct evidence for the truth of p. Second, S can also modify what s/he wants A to do. According to (14), by uttering a typical declarative, S expects A to believe p and thus asks A to adopt p into their set of beliefs. However, this is not the only thing S can do with declarative clauses. As we have seen above, the addition of a sentence-final particle in Cantonese renders a declarative into a request for confirmation. The particle modifies what S expects A to do with the utterance. Beyssade & Marandin 2006 refer to this aspect of the speech act as the *Call on Addressee* (henceforth CoA). We observe a similar pattern of speech act modification in English. Consider the difference between a regular declarative (15)a and one that is modified by the sentence final particle *eh* (15)b. Given its function, Heim et al. 2014 refer to this type of particles as *confirmational* and I follow this convention.

- (15) a. You are leaving.
 b. You are leaving, eh?

According to the conditions of use for a declarative assertion (15)a would be used if the conditions in (16) hold.

- (16) Conditions of use for declaratives

i) $Bel(S,p)$

ii) CoA: $Bel(A,p)$

Given that (15)a is a statement about A, its discourse conditions are slightly marked.

Some special circumstances must hold for S to felicitously tell A something about themselves. For example, S may use (15)a as an indirect command.

The conditions of use for the *eh*-modified declarative in (15)b differ. By uttering (15)b, S does not inform A that p and hence it cannot be used as an indirect command. Rather (15)b is used to confirm that S's belief is accurate. More precisely, S is not fully committed to the truth of p – though S has a bias towards believing p. I indicate this with a disjunctive commitment to p with opposite polarity values. Boldface on the positive belief is used to indicate the bias. In addition to modifying the commitment towards p, *eh* also modifies CoA. In particular, with the use of *eh*, S requests A to confirm her biased belief (17)ii.

(17) Conditions of use for *eh*-modified declaratives

i) **Bel (S,p)** \vee Bel (S, \neg p)


ii) CoA: Confirm (Bel (A,p))

In sum, *eh* appears to modify both S's commitment as well as CoA.

Based on the properties of speech act modifiers such as *eh*, I propose that there are two distinct layers that comprise SA-structure (see Heim et al. 2014 for more detailed discussion): a layer which is responsible for encoding the commitment of the speech act


participants towards *p* and a second layer where CoA is encoded. As indicated in (18), I refer to the lower layer as *GroundP* and the higher layer as *ResponseP*. The label *GroundP* is meant to evoke Clark & Brennan's 1991 notion of *grounding* as well as the notion of the common ground (cf. Heim et al, Thoma (in prep) and Heim & Wiltschko, to appear).

(18) A complex speech act structure



Moreover, speech act modifiers may also modify declarative clauses such that they express (S's assessment of) A's commitment towards *p*. Consequently, Lam argues that *GroundP* comes in two guises: one is relativized to S's set of beliefs (*Ground-S*) while the other is relativized to A's set of beliefs (*Ground-A*). Accordingly, the two particles introduced in (12) and (13) occupy different syntactic positions: *Ground-S* (*me1*) and *Ground-A* (*ho2*), respectively.

(19) An articulated grounding layer




With this model of SA-structure in place, we can now explore whether the hallmarks of ergativity can be detected in this domain. We shall see that argument-structure ergativity plays a role in both the grounding layer as well as in the response layer. As we shall see, interpretable roles are assigned in each of these layers (Grounding and responding roles); hence both structures are more akin to argument-structure than to case-structure and hence we expect to find argument-structure ergativity in both layers. However, before I show that this prediction is indeed borne out, I briefly discuss the relation between p-structure, grounding structure and response structure.

X.3.4 *The syntax of assertions*

Recall that according to Ross 1970, assertions are performative speech acts which encode something akin to “*I give p to you*”. According to the present analysis, which is based on contemporary understanding of speech acts, assertions are complex moves. That is, in a typical assertion, S conveys their commitment to the truth of p. At the same time they

request from A to adopt the same belief. I assume, following Truckenbrodt 2003, that the latter is encoded by means of a falling intonation contour. Thus, by means of a declarative S asserts that the proposition is in their belief set (Ground-S) and the assertive falling intonation asks A to do the same thing. This contrasts with rising intonation, which asks A to respond to the utterance. The syntax of typical assertions is schematized in (20).

(20) Syntax of assertions



Note that not every utterance needs to include a CoA or an assessment about A's belief set. That is, S may simply utter a declarative clause to indicate their commitment towards the truth of p, without requesting for A to share this commitment. Consider the example in (21).

(21) John runs into Mary and notices that she is walking a young puppy. He knows that she had wanted to get a new dog for a while. He exclaims:

You have a new dog!

Here John does not wish to inform Mary that she has a new dog. Instead, with the use of this declarative, John lets Mary know that he now knows that she has a new dog. In this way, the declarative clause-type serves as an exclamation. Note crucially that the intonational contour of a non-informative assertion differs from that associated with informative assertions.


This indicates that the response structure need not be projected. We can thus explore ergative constellations associated with the grounding structure independent of those associated with the response structure.

In what follows I show that we do indeed find ergative constellations in both these structures. I start with a discussion of ergative speech acts based on the grounding structure (section 4) and then I explore ergative speech acts based on the responding structure (section 5).

X.4 Ergativity and the grounding structure

Let us consider a basic declarative with Ground-S only. These constructions will serve as the basis relative to which we explore ergativity because they present us with the grounding structure version of transitive predicates. The internal argument corresponds to p-structure whereas the external argument corresponds to Ground-S, as in (22).

(22) Transitive grounding structure




Ground-S thus parallels the initiator of the grounding event, just like in Speas & Tenny's 2003 conceptualization of declaratives. However, the present proposal differs in the way the role of A is conceptualized. Within the grounding structure A is not viewed as the goal of the speech act but instead it may be understood as a role akin to a causative argument. It won't play a role in the syntax of ergative speech acts to which we now turn. That is, we expect there to be two types of intransitive grounding structures: unergative and ergative (aka unaccusative) structures.

X.4.1 *Unergative intransitive structure*

We expect unergative speech acts to consist of an external argument only, with the utterance being incorporated. I propose that this is the case in imperatives. In particular, I follow Portner 2004 in assuming that an imperative clause-type denotes a property. Since properties cannot function as arguments, the complement is incorporated, as in (23).

(23) Imperatives as unergatives.



Just as incorporated nouns denote properties rather than arguments, so does the propositional content of imperatives. In addition, I assume that Ground-S associated with imperatives contains a set of intentions, rather than a set of beliefs.⁶ Thus, the clause-type of the complement has an effect on the interpretation of Ground-S. For completeness note that a full-fledged SA-structure for imperatives would also contain the response structure, with a CoA which marks S's request that A put the same p-content into their set of intentions.

X.4.2 *Ergative intransitive speech acts*

Given the logic of our analysis, we expect that ergative speech acts lack the external argument of the grounding structure (Ground-S) but instead consist of the internal argument only. I propose that this is the case in a speech act known as *presentation*. This is a type of speech act not often discussed. The term is due to Faller (2002: 16), who


⁶ This corresponds to Portner's 2004 To-Do-list and Han's 2001 Plan-set.

argues that sentences with evidential markers have *presentative* rather than assertive force (see also Déchaine 2007, von Stechow 2003, Portner 2006). According to Déchaine et al. to appear, this speech act of has fewer commitments than assertions. In particular, its force is that of *presenting* a proposition for consideration without making a truth-claim about it. In other words, S puts forth p without committing to the truth of p (Déchaine et al. to appear: 6). According to Faller 2002 this type of speech act is triggered by evidential marking. The example in (24) is one of Faller’s examples from Cuzco Quechua and Faller’s description is as follows: *the speaker brings the embedded proposition into the conversation for consideration. That is the current speaker’s speech act is one of presentation of another speaker’s assertion. [...] There is no condition that the speaker believes p, and the illocutionary act is that of PRESENT.* Faller 2002: 198f.

- (24) Para-sha-n-si
rain-prog-3-si
p= ‘It is raining’
ILL = PRESENT (p) Faller 2002 199 (165)

Within our analysis, this amounts to saying that S does not express a propositional attitude towards the proposition – hence it doesn’t enter into Ground-S. Thus, I hypothesize that a presentative is a clause-type which lacks the external argument of the grounding layer (Ground-S), as in (25).

(25) Presentatives as ergatives



In this way, presentatives are the most basic speech acts: they contain the least amount of structure compared to all other speech-act types. This echoes Portner’s 2004 semantic analysis of this speech act, which takes it to be the most basic kind of update.

X.4.3 Summary

We have now seen that some of the commonly discussed speech acts (*assertions* and *requests*) as well as the less commonly discussed *presentation* can be analyzed as instantiating the three types of speech acts expected on the assumption that speech act structure parallels argument structure. Without taking into account the second layer above GroundP for now, we can summarize the parallelism as in Table X.1.

Argument-structure	Speech act structure
Transitive predicates	Declarative assertion
Unergatives predicates (qua concealed transitive)	Imperative
Unaccusative (ergative) predicates	Presentation


Table X.1 The parallelism between argument-structure and speech act structure

In what follows I show that similar considerations apply to the response structure.

X.5 Ergativity and the response structure

In section 3.3, I have introduced the idea that the grounding structure is dominated by a dedicated layer that encodes CoA. CoA refers to the aspect of a speech act which can be viewed as requesting a *response*. Hence I refer to this structure as the *response-structure*.

I propose that the response-structure itself is complex: it consists of a projection that hosts the subject of the response. In line with the convention established for argument-structure, where the head which introduces the external argument is labeled (little) *v*, I use the label *resp* for this layer. The internal argument of the response layer hosts the object of the response. The full response structure is illustrated in (26).



If there is indeed another layer above the grounding structure we expect to find two ergative constellations in the second layer as well. That is, just as there are two types of intransitive argument-structures and grounding structures, we expect to find two types of

intransitive response-structures. In this section I show that this is indeed the case. I argue that transitive response structures are realized as requests for confirmation (5.1).

Furthermore, I argue that polar questions are best analyzed as unergative structures (5.2).

As for ergative response-structures, I argue that this is instantiated by utterance-initial *ja* in Austrian German, which marks the utterance as a response (5.3).

X.5.1 Requests for confirmation as transitive response structures


In a transitive construal we expect that the utterance is marked for who is the responder as well as what it is that the responder is supposed to respond to. I argue that this is precisely the configuration we find in confirmation requests marked by sentence final confirmational, such as in (27).

(27) You are leaving now, huh?

I assume that the particle *huh* marks what S wants A to respond to (namely her believe that p). Thus, *huh* marks the utterance as the object of the requested response. In this way, Resp has a similar function as *v* in that it marks the sister of its complement as an object (in this case the object of the response). I further assume that the rising intonation realized on the confirmational encodes CoA (see Heim et al. 2014 for more detailed

discussion). I further assume that A is associated with the specifier of *respP* by external merge.⁷ This is illustrated in (28), where rising intonation is represented as /.

(28) Transitive response structure



Evidence that the sentence-final particle *huh* marks the object of the response stems from the fact that there are different types of confirmational. While all of them are used to request confirmation, they differ according to what S wants confirmation for (i.e., what A is asked to respond to). Consider the examples in (29).

(29) Mary has been planning to go on a trip for a while but she had never set a date.

One day, she decides to pack and hop on the next train. Her roommate John witnesses her packing.

a. John: You are leaving now, {eh/right?}

⁷ It is for this reason that response-structure cannot be equated with case-structure. In the domain of case-structure, argument positions are filled by internal merge rather than external merge (with the exception of expletives).

b. Mary: I'm leaving now, {*eh* /#right?}

Consider first (29)a. In this context, John is pretty certain that Mary is leaving, though there is a chance that she is just packing her clothes to bring them to the dry-cleaner. John can use (29)a to request confirmation of his belief that Mary is leaving. This differs from (29)b. Mary knows very well that she is leaving, and she is pretty certain that John also knows. However, there is a chance that John may think she is just preparing her clothes for the dry cleaner. Here Mary can use (29)b to confirm that John knows that she is leaving. In other words, S is requesting confirmation that her belief about A's belief is correct. In both utterances, *eh* is used to request confirmation. The request itself is encoded by the rising intonation on the particle. However, the utterances differ in what they request to be confirmed. *Eh* has two possible uses. It can be used to request confirmation of S's belief regarding p but it can also be used to request confirmation of S's assumption about A's belief. Thus, *eh* marks the propositional attitude of S or A as the object of the response.

In contrast, *right* doesn't mark the propositional attitude towards the proposition as the object of the response but instead the proposition itself. In other words, with the use of *right*, S requests confirmation that a given proposition is true. Therefore, the use of *right* cannot be relativized to what A believes.

In sum, while requests for confirmation share several aspects of meaning with regular questions (i.e., both require a response and thus involve a CoA) they also differ from regular questions, as I discuss in the next subsection.

X.5.2 Polar questions as unergative response-structures


Given the complex SA-structure in (26), we expect that unergative response-structures mark the subject of response only. I argue that this is the case in standard questions marked with rising intonation. As in requests for confirmation, rising intonation marks the subject of the response (i.e., CoA), but the object of response is not explicitly marked. Hence, questions are compatible with contexts where S is asking for information because s/he doesn't know the answer as in (30)a. But questions are also compatible with contexts in which S knows the answer. This may be in contexts where S wants to test A and hence inquires whether A knows the answer, as in (31). Similarly, in (32) S knows perfectly well that A does not know the answer. This question is only asked to solicit a response from A.

- (30) Mary has been planning to go on a trip for a while but she had never set a date. Her roommate John wants to know whether she is still planning to go. He asks: Are you still going on your trip?
- (31) History teacher to student in grade 5: Did Columbus discover America?
- (32) You know who lives there? Huh? No you wouldn't know who lives there I'm just saying, and you know who lives there?." (scene from Martin Scorsese's Taxi driver)

In sum, I argue that yes/no questions with rising intonation are used to mark the utterance as one that requires a response. That is, Ground-S indicates that the p-structure of the

utterance is in the set of questions (recall from section 4.1 that the clause-type determines the relevant discourse component in GroundP). Furthermore, I assume that rising intonation associates with *respP* to mark that A should respond (Heim 2015). Since the object of the response is not explicitly marked (unlike in requests for confirmation marked by tags) this corresponds to an unergative intransitive constellation, as shown in (33).

(33) Unergative intransitive response structure



X.5.3 *Ergative response-structure: marking the utterance as a response*


Finally, we also expect to find utterances in which only the object of response is marked but not the subject. I argue that this is the case in utterances which are themselves marked as a response without requesting a response. Note that exclamatives are S-oriented speech acts: no response is requested. Nevertheless, exclamatives can still be embedded under the response structure. In particular, in spoken German, any utterance (including exclamatives) can be introduced by a sentence-initial response particle (*jo*). It marks the utterance it introduces as a response. To see this, consider the example in (34) and their representation in (35). In (34) it is the absence of a predicted event that triggers A's

exclamation. While the presence of *jo* is not obligatory, its use is strongly preferred. I suggest that this is because *jo* explicitly marks the utterance as a response.

- (34) **Context.** A and B are co-workers. Their working hours are fixed and they always go home at 4.30. Typically, they get ready to leave at 4.25 so they can be out the door by 4.30. Today B is not showing any signs of getting ready even at 4.25. A comments:

Jo du oaweit-st heit long!?
 JO you work-2SG today long
 ‘You’re working long today.’

- (35) Ergative response-structure



Note that this use of the response particle *ja* differs from its use as an affirmative response marker in form and function. The sentence-initial response marker discussed here is prosodically integrated with the utterance it introduces and it cannot stand alone. In its use as an affirmative response marker *jo* is associated with its own prosodic contour and can thus stand alone. Furthermore, as an affirmative response marker it can only

respond to yes/no questions whereas as a marker of response *jo* can respond to any speech act as well as non-linguistic events as in (34). For further discussion of the grammar of this type of response particle see Wiltschko (in prep.).

X.6 Conclusion

In this paper I have explored the idea that ergative constellations are detectable in the syntax of speech acts. This idea is a logical consequence of Ross' 1970 performative hypothesis and its more recent incarnations (Speas & Tenny 2003, Haegeman 2013). This is because the logic of ergativity operates on the composition of predicate-argument structures and speech act structure can be conceived of as a special kind of such structure. In particular, the ergative constellations we observe mirror those found in the domain of argument-structure. I have argued SA- structure is best analyzed as consisting of two distinct layers. The lower layer (GroundP) consists of the utterance and a level where the speech act participant's commitment to that utterance is expressed, i.e., their propositional attitudes. We have also seen evidence for another layer (RespP) which is dedicated to encoding the Call on Addressee in the sense of Beyssade & Marandin 2006. In particular, I have suggested that this can be understood as a layer responsible for the responsive aspect of language. With this framework in mind, we were able to explore ergative constellations

In the domain of argument-structure ergativity it is widely acknowledged that we need to distinguish not only between transitive and intransitive predicates but also between two types of intransitive predicates: unergatives and ergatives (aka unaccusatives). I have argued that we find the same division in the domain of speech act

structure. In particular, in the grounding domain the internal argument is the proposition whereas the external argument corresponds to the participant whose commitment towards p is expressed. On this view, declaratives are analyzed as transitive clause-types, imperatives are analyzed as unergatives, and presentatives are analyzed as ergative speech acts.

In addition, we have seen evidence for an articulated response structure, where both subject and object of response can be marked. Both are marked in requests for confirmation (by means of confirmational) but only one the subject of the response is marked in regular questions. We have further seen that there is a dedicated marker in German which serves to mark the utterance as a response. In the absence of a CoA (as is the case with exclamatives) this results in an ergative constellation in that only the object of the response is marked.

For obvious reasons this paper has to remain programmatic in nature. The main point to take away from it is that, everything else being equal, we expect ergative constellations not to be restricted to the domain of argument- and case-structure. If we are indeed dealing with a matter of structural configurations, as assumed by most work in the generative tradition, then these structural configurations should not be restricted to one particular domain. We have further seen that this avenue of research is fruitful in that it brings to light different types of speech acts including some that are not standardly discussed. However, due to the exploratory nature of this enterprise we only discussed a limited number of such speech ac types. However, if the proposed grammar of speech acts is indeed on the right track, we expect a more complex and fine-grained typology of

speech acts as typically assumed. It is my hope that this paper will inspire others to explore the structure of speech acts from this angle.

References

- Aldridge, Edith. 2008. Generative approaches to ergativity. *Language and Linguistic Compass: Syntax and Morphology* 2:966–995.
- Anand, Pranav, and Andrew Nevins. 2006. The Locus of Ergative Case Assignment: Evidence from Scope. In *Ergativity: Emerging Issues*, ed. Alana Johns, Diane Massam, and Juvenal Ndayiragije, 143–171. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Anderson, Stephen. 1971. On the linguistic status of the performative/constative distinction. Indiana University Linguistics Club publication.
- Bach, Kent and Robert Harnish. 1979. *Linguistic communication and speech acts*. Cambridge: MIT Press
- Baker, Mark. in press . On dependent ergative case (in Shipibo) and its derivation by phase. *Linguistic Inquiry* 45: 3.
- Baker, Mark, Kyle Johnson and Ian Roberts. 1989. Passive arguments raised, *Linguistic Inquiry* 20: 219–251.
- Baker, Mark and Nadezhda Vinokurova. 2010. Two modalities of case assignment in Sakha. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* 28:593-642.
- Den Besten, Hans 1981. Some remarks on the Ergative Hypothesis. mimeographed. University of Amsterdam.

- Beyssade, Claire. and Jean-Marie Marandin. 2006. The Speech Act Assignment Problem Revisited: Disentangling Speaker's Commitment from Speaker's Call on Addressee, in Selected papers of CSSP 2005, 37-68. Available at http://www.cssp.cnrs.fr/eiss6/index_en.html.
- Bittner, Maria and Ken Hale. 1996. Ergativity: toward a theory of a heterogeneous class. *Linguistic Inquiry* 27: 531-604.
- Bobaljik, Jonathan David. 1993. On Ergativity and Ergative Unergatives. In *Papers on Case and Agreement II*, ed. Colin Phillips, volume 19 of *MIT Working Papers in Linguistics*, 45–88. Cambridge, MA: MITWPL.
- Bobaljik, Jonathan David. 2008. Where's Phi? Agreement as a postsyntactic operation. In *Phi theory*, ed. Daniel Harbour, David Adger, and Susana Béjar, 295–328. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Borer, Hagit. 1994. The projections of arguments. In Elena Benedicto and Jeff Runner (eds.), *Functional Projections*. Amherst, MA: GLSA, University of Massachusetts.
- Borer, Hagit. 2005. *The normal course of events*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Burzio, Luigi. 1986. *Italian Syntax*. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel
- Campana, Mark. 1992. A movement theory of ergativity. Doctoral Dissertation, McGill University.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1981. *Lectures on government and binding*. Dordrecht: Foris.
- Chomsky, Noam. 1995. *The minimalist program*. Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press.
- Clark, Herbert and Susan Brennan. 1991. Grounding in communication. *Perspectives on socially shared cognition* 13: 127-149.

- Cook, Claire. 2008. The syntax and semantics of clause-typing in Plains Cree. PhD dissertation UBC.
- Coon, Jessica. 2013. *Aspects of Split Ergativity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Coon, Jessica and Omer Preminger. 2013. Taking Ergativity out of Split Ergativity: A Unified Account of Aspect and Person Splits. Ms. McGill University, Syracuse University.
- Coon, Jessica and Omer Preminger. This volume. Split ergativity is not about ergativity. In *Oxford handbook of ergativity*, eds. Jessica Coon, Diane Massam & Lisa Travis, Oxford University Press.
- Deal, Amy-Rose. To appear. Ergativity. in Artemis Alexiadou and Tibor Kiss (eds.), *International Handbook on Syntactic Contemporary Research*, 2nd edition. Mouton.
- Déchaine, Rose-Marie. 2007. The evidential base. Paper presented at NELS 38.
- Déchaine, Rose-Marie, Claire Cook, Jeff Muehlbauer, and Ryan Waldie. 2014. (De-)constructing evidentiality. Ms. UBC.
- Dixon, R.M.W. 1979. Ergativity. *Language* 55:59–138.
- Folli, Raffaella and Heidi Harley. 2004. Consuming results: flavors of little v. In: Kempchinsky, P., Slabakova, R. (Eds.), *Aspectual Inquiries*. Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 1–25.
- Fraser, Bruce. 1974. An examination of the performative analysis. *Papers in Linguistics*, 7: 140.

- Gärtner, Hans Martin and Markus Steinbach. 2006. A skeptical note on the syntax of speech acts and point of view. *Form, Structure, Grammar. Akademie-Verlag, Berlin*, 213-222.
- Gazdar, Gerald. 1979. *Pragmatics: Implicature, Presupposition and Logical Form*. New York: Academic Press.
- Giorgi, Alessandra. 2010. *About the speaker: Towards a syntax of indexicality*. Oxford Studies in Theoretical Linguistics. OUP
- Grewendorf, Günther. 1972. Sprache ohne Kontext. Zur Kritik der performativen Analyse. in *Linguistische Pragmatik*, edited by Dieter Wunderlich. Frankfurt/M.: Athenäum. 144-182
- Haegeman, Liliane. 2013. West Flemish Verb-based Discourse Markers and the Articulation of the Speech Act Layer. *Studia Linguistica*, 116-39.
- Haegeman, Liliane and Virginia Hill. 2013. The syntactization of discourse. In: *Syntax and its limits*, ed. Raffaella Folli, Christina Sevdali, and Robert Truswell 370-390. Oxford University Press.
- Haegeman, Liliane. 2014. West flemish verb-based discourse markers and the articulation of the speech act layer. *Studia Linguistica* **68**: 116-139.
- Hale, Ken and Samuel Keyser. 1993. *Prolegomenon to a Theory of Argument Structure*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Han, Chung-Hye. 2000. *The structure and interpretation of imperatives: Mood and force in Universal Grammar*. Series in Outstanding Dissertations in Linguistics, Garland Publishing/Routledge, New York
- Heim, Johannes. 2015. Expertise and Common Ground. Unpublished ms. UBC.

- Heim, Johannes, Keupdjio, Hermann, Lam, Zoe Wai Man, Osa-Gómez, Adriana, and Martina Wiltschko. 2014. How to Do Things with Particles. Proceedings of the CLA.
- Hill, Virginia. 2007. Vocatives and the pragmatics: Syntax interface. *Lingua* **117**: 2077–2105.
- Hill, Virginia, and Melita Stavrou. 2013. *Vocatives: How Syntax Meets with Pragmatics*. Leiden: Brill.
- Hill, Virginia. 2013. Features and Strategies: The Internal Syntax of Vocative Phrases. In *Vocatives! Addressing between System and Performance*, ed. Barbara Sonnenhauser and Patrizia Noel Aziz Hanna. 79-102. Berlin: Mouton De Gruyter.
- Kiparsky, Paul. 1998. Partitive case and aspect. In *Projecting from the Lexicon* ed. Miriam. Butt and William. Geuder. Stanford: CSLI.
- Koopman, Hilda and Dominique Sportiche. 1991. On the position of subjects. *Lingua*, **85**: 211-258.
- Krifka, Manfred. 2013. Response Particles as Propositional Anaphors. Proceedings of SALT 23, 1-18.
- Laka, Itziar. 2006. Deriving split ergativity in the progressive: The case of Basque. In *Ergativity: Emerging issues*, ed. Alana Johns, Diane Massam and Juvenal Ndayiragije, 173-196. Dordrecht: Springer.
- Lam, Zoe Wai Man. 2014. A complex ForceP for speaker- and addressee-oriented discourse particles in Cantonese. *Studies in Chinese Linguistics* **35**: 61-80.
- Legate, Julie. 2008. Morphological and abstract case. *Linguistic Inquiry* **39**:55-102.

- Mahajan, Anoop. 2012. Ergatives, antipassives and the overt light v in Hindi. *Lingua* **122**: 204-214.
- Marantz, Alec. 1991. Case and licensing. Paper presented at The 8th Eastern States Conference on Linguistics, University of Maryland, Baltimore.
- Massam, Diane. 2001. Pseudo noun incorporation in Niuean. *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory* **19**: 153-197.
- Megerdooian, Karine. 2000. Aspect and Partitive Objects in Finnish. *Proceedings of the West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics*, 19, 316-328.
- Mittwoch, Anita. 1977. How to refer to one's own words: speech-act modifying adverbials and the performative analysis. *Journal of Linguistics* **13**: 177-189.
- Miyagawa, Shigeru. 2013. Surprising Agreements at T and C. unpublished ms. MIT
- Murasugi, Kumiko. 1992. *Crossing and Nested Paths: NP-Movement in Nominative and Accusative Languages*. PhD Dissertation. MIT. [Distributed by MITWPL].
- Nash, Lea. 1996. The Internal Ergative Subject Hypothesis. *NELS* 26: 195-210.
- Newmeyer, Fritz. 1986. *Linguistic Theory in America*. New York Academic Press.
- Paul, Waltraud. 2014. Why particles are not particular: Sentence-final particles in Chinese as heads of a split CP. *Studia Linguistica* **68**: 77-115.
- Perlmutter, David. 1978. Impersonal Passives and the Unaccusative Hypothesis. *Proceedings of the 4th Annual Meeting of the Berkeley Linguistics Society* 157-190.
- Portner, Paul. 2005. The Semantics of Imperatives within a Theory of Clause Types'. In. *Proceedings of SALT 14* ed. K. Watanabe and R.B. Young. Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications.

- Portner, P. 2006. Comments on Faller's Paper. talk presented at the Workshop on
Philosophy and Linguistics, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, November 3-5,
2006.
- Ramchand, Gillian. 2010. *Verb Meaning and the Lexicon*. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
- Ross, John R. 1970. On declarative sentences. In *Readings in English Transformational
Grammar*, ed. Roderick A. Jacobs and Peter S. Rosenbaum, 222–272. Waltham,
MA: Ginn and Company.
- Saddock, Jerrold. 1969. Hypersentences. *Papers in Linguistics*, I , 283-370.
- Speas, Margaret. 2004. Evidentiality, logophoricity and the syntactic representation of
pragmatic features. *Lingua* **114**: 255–276.
- Speas, Margaret and Carol Tenny. 2003. Configurational Properties of Point of View
Roles. In *Asymmetry in Grammar* ed. Anna-Maria Di Sciullo. 315-343.
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
- Truckenbrodt, Hubert. 2012. Semantics of intonation. In *Semantics. An international
handbook of natural language meaning*. Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von
Heusinger and Paul Portner (eds.), *Vol. 3*, 2039-2969. Berlin: de Gruyter.
- Von Stechow, Kai. 2003. Epistemic modals and conditionals revisited. Paper presented at
the UMAss Linguistics colloquium.
- Williams, Edwin. 2003. *Representation Theory*. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.
- Wiltschko, Martina. in prep. Response particles beyond answering. Paper for a not-yet-
announced Festschrift.

- Woolford, Ellen. 1997. Four-way case systems: ergative, nominative, objective, and accusative. *Natural Language and Linguistic Theory* **15**:181-227.
- Woolford, Ellen. 2006. Lexical case, inherent case, and argument structure. *Linguistic Inquiry* **37**:111-130.
- Zanuttini, Raffaella and Paul Portner. 2003. Exclamative clauses: At the syntax-semantics interface. *Language*, 39-81.
- Zanuttini, Raffaella. 2008. Encoding the Addressee in the Syntax: Evidence from English Imperative Subjects. *Natural Language & Linguistic Theory*, 185-218.
- Zu, Vera. 2014. Probing for Conversation Participants: The Case of Jingpo. *Proceedings of The 49th Annual Regional Meeting of Chicago Linguistic Society*, 2014.